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hen al-Qaeda struck on 9/11, a large majority of citizens in Europe probably felt that 
the world would never be the same anymore. Although there are no reliable instant 
surveys to prove this claim, a quick glance at the newspaper headings of the hours and 
days that followed the attacks lends credence to the argument that most Europeans too saw 9/11 
as a defining moment for a whole generation. In the midst of dramatic assertions that a Third 
World War had begun and sweeping portrayals of the future as an existential struggle between 
the West and the Rest (the latter soon came to be defined as some sort of a global Islamic 
insurgency), only a few voices called for a more balanced judgment of the tragic events of that 
day. It should also be noted that some comments showed a discernible lack of empathy when 
claiming that the United States were partly to blame for the attacks. But on the whole the tragic 
images of the burning towers, the poignant accounts by survivors and the burials of the victims 
in the following weeks, unleashed  a demonstration of spontaneous solidarity with the United 
States, articulated by an editorial in the French newspaper Le Monde on September 13, 2001: 
‘Nous sommes tous Américains ! – We’re All Americans!’. 
Looking back, it can now be stated that as far as Europe is concerned, 9/11 was neither 
the definer of an era nor the watershed moment many Europeans considered it to be at the time. 
9/11 undoubtedly had an impact, even a significant one, in both foreign and domestic policies. It 
reinforced pre-existing trends and tendencies, crystallized positions and hardened points of view. 
But a decade later this impact has largely subsided and has again given way to the same forces 
profondes that were shaping the continent before the terrorist attacks and that far exceed 9/11 in 
lasting importance. Only in one, unanticipated, respect did 9/11 have a lasting impact. It 
furthered political integration – in particular in the fields of justice and internal security  – to a 
degree few would have imagined some years earlier. This illustrates an old truth concerning the 
construction of the continent: European integration moves forward through crises, each crisis 
pushing its member states closer together in an intricate web of interdependent relationships. 
Assessing the overall impact of 9/11 on European societies and politics however is not an 
easy undertaking. Europe’s complex mosaic defies easy generalizations. Different political and 
cultural traditions, diverse approaches in dealing with ethnic and religious minorities, dissimilar 
national experiences with terrorism and lack of detailed cross-national research complicate 
generalizations . 
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The Fear Factor  
It has often been assumed that following 9/11 Europe too fell under the spell of an all-
pervasive fear of terrorist attacks and European citizens began to live in a constant state of 
anxiety about ‘Muslim terrorists’ plotting and planning imminent attacks in cities across the 
continent. Surveys however reveal a more nuanced account. 
It has long been overlooked, but fear for terrorist attacks has never been equally strong 
across Europe. In 2006 Edwin Bakker for the first time explored the striking differences in threat 
perception among the 25 member states of the European Union, based upon the periodic 
Eurobarometer survey of public opinion across Europe.
1 
In the spring of 2003, the public was 
asked for the first time to identify the two most important issues their country was facing. Only 
in Spain a majority mentioned terrorism, followed by the UK (28 percent) and Italy (24 percent). 
In Finland and Sweden a mere 3 percent mentioned terrorism, and hardly more Portuguese, 
Greeks and Irish did so. In 2004 the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe were 
included and an additional east-west gap appeared, with extremely low percentages declaring 
terrorism an important issue in ‘New Europe’ as compared to some of the original member 
states. No single explanation accounts for these discrepancies across Europe. Bakker identifies a 
set of factors that all played a part, such as recent and past experience with terrorism, 
involvement with the U.S. War on Terror, the way in which society and politics tend to react to 
insecurity and the presence of sizeable Muslim communities. 
Notwithstanding the alarming headlines in Europe’s newspapers immediately after the 
attacks, Europe never completely subscribed to the American paradigm that the attacks of 9/11 
‘revealed the outlines of a new world’ and ‘provided a warning of future dangers of terror 
networks aided by outlaw regimes and ideologies that incite the murder of the innocent, and 
weapons of mass destruction that multiply destructive power’, as president George W. Bush 
portrayed.
2 
It is true that official discourse (and media) often described terrorism in similar 
existential terms, with the Spanish prime minister José María Aznar as a typical example: 
‘Terrorism changed the agenda of the world.’3 But, with the exception of the UK and Spain, 
terrorism never became a prime concern for European citizens (save in the immediate post 9/11 
months).
4
 Moreover, in academia and think tanks a certain scepticism as to the saliency of the 
threat has always been present, and increasingly so after 2004 – and in spite of major attacks in 
Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. The ‘state of the threat’ was a regular agenda item in 
terrorism-related meetings but it was often depicted in less dramatic terms than in American 
debates. 
By the mid-2000s, when mainstream opinion in the U.S. imagined jihadist terrorism to be 
a hydra-headed foe of global dimensions and local terrorist groups to be part of a worldwide 
Islamist insurgency, directed and influenced in one way or another by an omnipresent al-Qaeda, 
European observers and practitioners were engaged in alternative analyses. A view that 
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circulated in that period in the European counterterrorism community was that of a ‘patchwork 
of self-radicalising cells with international contacts, without any central engine and without any 
central organisational design’. Such a patchwork closely resembled the radical left terrorist 
groups Europe had experienced in the 70s and 80s, or the anarchists in the late nineteenth 
century – or modern-day criminal networks, alternately cooperating and acting autonomously, 
depending upon circumstances.
5
 
Such analyses mirrored a deeper trend in European public opinion in the decade 
following 9/11. Even in countries where anxiety over terrorism scored high at times in public 
perceptions, it nevertheless showed an inexorable decline after 2001, interrupted only by 
occasional spikes each time a significant terrorist incident occurred. In 2004 as many as 16 
percent of European citizens identified terrorism as one of the two most important issues facing 
their countries. It has since dropped steadily (with an unexpected rise to 7-13 percent in 2010-
2011), to an historic low of 2 percent in May 2012. This in turn reflected the decreasing 
significance of terrorism in Europe, as is made clear by the Europol statistics. Even if (for 
methodological reasons) the absolute figures of the Europe-wide police agency should be 
approached with caution, the declining trend in terrorism related arrests and plots in the 2000s is 
obvious. In 2009 the number of (failed, foiled, or successful) attacks was almost half the number 
of attacks in 2007 and this pattern of sustained decrease has persisted ever since.
6 
In 2011 not 
one single “religiously-inspired” terrorist attack on EU territory was reported by member states. 
This stands in stark contrast to 110 separatist attacks for that year. Although mostly small scale, 
in Europe the separatist strand of terrorism (Corsican groups in France, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
in Spain, or the Irish Republican Army in Great Britain) has always been many times larger than 
the jihadist strand, as the Europol statistics also make clear. But overall, since 2007 all forms of 
terrorism have been declining in Europe, as the following chart shows.  
Number of (failed, foiled or completed) attacks; number of arrested suspects in EU 
(2007-2011) 
 
Source: Terrorism Situation and Threat Report (TE-SAT). Europol, 2012 
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Despite the official European discourse routinely describing terrorism, and especially its 
jihadist strand, as a threat to the European way of life and its values, by and large Europeans 
showed greater skepticism than what this discourse might suggest. In the 2000s the issue of 
terrorism never became of overriding concern to most Europeans – especially when compared to 
more pressing issues such as the economic situation, unemployment, rising prices – and 
immigration. 
 
Immigrant a.k.a. Muslim a.k.a. Terrorist 
Commenting upon the London attacks, Charles Krauthammer wrote in the Washington 
Post: ‘Europe has incubated an enemy within, a threat that for decades Europe simply refused to 
face.’7 Ever since 9/11 right wing pundits have been linking immigration with terrorism. In doing 
so they were building on an anti-Islam tendency that had started to take shape prior to 9/11. This 
fact has been overlooked as a result of the maelstrom of vitriolic anti-Islamic rhetoric that 
followed the terrorist attacks, but prior to 9/11 Islamophobia was already considered such a 
growing global phenomenon that immediate action was considered necessary to combat its 
spread. As Christopher Allen has judiciously noted, just a few days before 9/11, the UN 
sponsored World Conference against Racism in Durban formally recognized Islamophobia, 
‘thereby establishing anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic prejudice, discrimination, and hatred and 
placing it alongside other equally discriminatory and exclusionary phenomena, such as anti-
Semitism and anti-Roma’.8  
September 11 thus did not create Islamophobia, but its fallout built upon preexisting 
attitudes and sentiments in the member states of the European Union, reinforcing them and 
broadening their audience from the radical right to mainstream politics and even forging a rare 
rapprochement between rightwing and leftwing criticism of Islam and Muslims. 
 The beginnings of Islamophobia in Europe were visible two decades earlier. In 
the mid 1980s, the author and playwright Caryl Phillips travelled through Europe and wrote in 
his travel narrative, The European Tribe (1987), how he felt racism and the radical right were 
increasing everywhere as a result of the disappearance of religious, political and cultural 
frontiers
.9
 In October 1985, Le Figaro Magazine carried a cover story representing a bust of a 
veiled Marianne, accompanied by the distressing headline ‘Serons-nous toujours Français dans 
30 ans ? – Will we still be French in 30 years time ?’.10 The journal articulated a growing 
concern over immigration in the 1980s in Europe, when Europeans began to realize that the 
‘migrant workers’ who had arrived en masse in the 1960s to compensate for domestic labor 
shortages, were here to stay and were joined by their families in the following decades. Between 
1981 and 1990, according to the European Values Systems Study, intolerance significantly grew, 
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as did feelings of ethnic threat by cultural minorities, at least in some member states. However, 
throughout the 1990s, sentiments of intolerance towards ethnic minorities fluctuated and were 
never static. In that decade they first tended to stabilize,
11 
but increased again after 1997. 
Eurobarometer surveys similarly point to a general increase of resistance to multicultural society 
between 1997 and 2000 and a similar increase in respondents confirming that multicultural 
society had reached its limits.
12 
 
Radical right parties capitalized on these incipient but fluctuating apprehensions, exactly 
as the nativist movement had done in 19
th
 century America or in the 1920s, when mass arrivals 
of Italians, Poles, Jews and Slavs sparked fears of the ‘mongrelization of the white race’. As 
always in the history of mass migration, particular cultural characteristics were now again 
singled out, because they offered the visual identifiers that set newcomers apart from native 
society. In the 1990s it became standard practice, in particular in the radical right, but not limited 
to this fringe, to equate ‘immigrant’ with ‘Muslim’. In the Netherlands, maverick politician Pim 
Fortuyn (who was murdered by an environmental activist in 2002) warned against the 
‘Islamicisation of our culture’. In France, the Front National campaigned on the platform of the 
return of Muslim immigrants to their countries of origin, claiming that Islam was incompatible 
with European culture. In Belgium, the comparable radical right party Vlaams Blok (‘Flemish 
Bloc’, predecessor of the actual Flemish Interest) made the suppression of Muslim influences a 
central feature of its anti-immigration campaign. Communities, who by visual identifiers were 
easily associated with Islam, were thus particularly and increasingly at risk of becoming targets 
of ethnic xenophobia directed towards ethnic minority communities.
13
 
But throughout the 1990s alternative narratives co-existed to explain the difficulties of 
the multicultural society. The culturalist finger-pointing of the radical right was met with 
warnings about the dramatic socioeconomic position of the immigrant ‘subclass’, that fueled a 
considerable amount of potential discontent waiting to erupt.
14
 
The attacks of 9/11 anchored the European debate on immigration firmly around the 
culturalist paradigm. In mainstream thinking too, their culture now came to be seen as the major 
obstacle to the immigrants’ integration.15 Topics such as discrimination, disadvantaged 
socioeconomic position, and unemployment in the immigrant communities faded away from the 
public discourse. A social question thus came to be seen through an essentially cultural lens, 
even narrowed down to a question of identity. In this perception, the significant diversity within 
Muslim communities and diasporic communities from Muslim-majority countries was 
compressed into a single monolithic category of ‘Muslims’, conflating ethnicity with religion.  
 By coincidence, this attitude was met with (and fed) a simultaneous development 
among the second and third generation immigrants from communities originating from Muslim-
majority countries. These European-born Muslims were often better educated than their parents 
and thus more sensitive to the feeling of being considered second-class citizens in their home 
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countries. This tension is common among the children and grandchildren of immigrants 
regardless of era and ethnic origin. Some among the children and grandchildren of immigrants 
from Muslim-majority countries who had migrated to Europe in the 1960s started to identify 
themselves by emphasizing their religious affiliation – the perceived cause of their 
discrimination.
16
 Pew surveys in the mid-2000s found Islamic identity to be strong among 
Europe’s Muslims with most self identifying as Muslims, rather than by nationality.17 
Muslims thus often became ‘stereotypically portrayed in media reports as a devoutly 
religious and undifferentiated group sharing a fundamentalist version of Islam’.18 Moreover, the 
once quintessential radical right anti-Islam stance was now joined by a rigorous anticlerical 
stance of the Left in some kind of a joint anti-Islamic Kulturkampf, propelling a fierce debate on 
the compatibility of Islam with western values. In most member states, this debate spiked 
between 2004 and 2006.
19 
The murder of the Dutch moviemaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 and the 
terrorist attacks the same year in Madrid and the next year in London played a crucial role in this 
polarization. The perpetrators of the attacks were not foreigners coming to Europe in order to 
carry out attacks but individuals mostly born and raised in Europe. But even in this ‘long-term 
low in community relations’20 in Europe, not all publics in the member states showed the same 
degree of hostility towards Muslim communities. Majorities in Great Britain and France, as well 
as pluralities in Spain and Poland, hold a somewhat or very favorable view of Muslims. Among 
the Dutch and Germans however a majority or plurality holds unfavorable views of Muslims (51 
and 47 percent, respectively).
21
 
This febrile atmosphere surrounding the debate on the place of Muslims in European 
society prevented bridge building between communities and the restoration of some degree of 
social cohesion. Simultaneously, surveys pointed to the emergence of a specific European Islam, 
marrying modernity and Islamic values. The same surveys clearly highlighted (as did some 
national surveys) that European Muslims’ worries were essentially the same as those of their 
non-Muslim neighbors: they worried about their future, and they were more concerned about 
unemployment than cultural or religious issues.
22
 The most hopeful conclusion that these surveys 
produced, was that Europe’s Muslims were part of the social mainstream:  
‘They side with Islamic moderates, not fundamentalists, and the overwhelming majority reject 
extreme tactics like suicide bombing as a way to win political objectives. These Muslims express 
more temperate views of Westerners than those in the Middle East or Asia. A majority also 
express favorable opinions of Christians and have less negative views of Jews. (…) While 
Europe’s Muslim minorities are about as likely as Muslims elsewhere to see relations between 
Westerners and Muslims as generally bad, they more often associate positive attributes to 
Westerners – including tolerance, generosity, and respect for women. And in a number of 
respects Muslims in Europe are less inclined to see a clash of civilizations than are some of the 
general publics surveyed in Europe. Notably, they are less likely than non-Muslims in Europe to 
believe that there is a conflict between modernity and being a devout Muslim.’23 
 7 
But feverish debates in the European public sphere precluded any meeting of minds. 
They reinforced preexisting sentiments of ethnic threat posed by minorities. Nevertheless, by 
2006 these feelings started to decrease in some member states and by 2007 even returned to 1991 
levels in some countries.
24
 In 2008 a Pew survey found that the views of each toward the other 
were far from uniformly negative. Even in the wake of the tumultuous events of 2005, solid 
majorities in France, Great Britain and the U.S. retained overall favorable opinions of Muslims. 
But in Spain and, more modestly in the U.K. positive opinions of Muslims declined.
25
 
Since 2006, positive and negative developments have co-existed and fluctuated. This 
made the European mental map as diverse as it had always been before 9/11. On the positive 
side, it is worth mentioning that – compared to the backlash that followed the murder of van 
Gogh or the publication of anti-Mohammed cartoons in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten in 
2005 – no comparable reaction followed the release of an anti-Islam movie Fitna by the Dutch 
politician Geert Wilders in 2008. Similarly, when a Swiss referendum in the following year 
banned the construction of minarets and France andBelgium passed laws between 2010 and 2012 
(in the Netherlands a similar ban is still under consideration) that prohibited the wearing of the 
burqa in public, there was no significant Muslim reaction. In 2010 and 2011, according to the 
annual surveys by the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., immigration continued to dominate 
headlines in Europe (and North America) as never before. But given the widespread worry about 
the economy and migration flows from North Africa, it should be noted that overall perceptions 
of immigrants remained stable. Moreover, majorities in all countries except the United Kingdom 
saw immigration as culturally enriching and publics generally did not agree that immigrants take 
jobs away from native workers. It should be noted however that in a number of EU countries, 
albeit not in all, Muslim immigrants often are seen as posing higher integration challenges than 
other immigrants.
26
 In some countries anti-Islamic and anti-immigration parties started to lose 
some of their steam, as was experienced by the Vlaams Belang/’Flemish Interest’ in Belgium, 
the Folkeparti in Denmark and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party in the Netherlands. 
On the negative side, mainstream politicians have joined German Chancellor Merkel 
(who already had done so in 2004) in reigniting the discussion on integration, with British Prime 
Minister Cameron calling multiculturalism ‘dead’ and Volker Kauder, president of the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, emphasizing that Islam did not belong 
in Germany since it was not part of German tradition and identity.
27
 None of them, however, 
detailed what this judgment implied for everyday life of immigrants and natives alike. During the 
2012 French presidential election campaign, outgoing president Sarkozy tried wooing far-right 
voters by emphasizing nationalist themes, such as restoring border controls and limiting 
immigration, but also by trumpeting the threat of Islamist groups after an isolated lone wolf, 
Mohammed Merah, had killed seven people in a series of shootings in Montauban and Toulouse 
in March 2012. In some member states, anti-Islamic and anti-immigration parties have recently 
gained significant traction (such as the True Finns in 2011, Greece’s Golden Dawn and France’s 
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Marine Le Pen who obtained a high turnout in the first round of the French presidential elections 
in April 2012).  
Clearly more worryinghas been the crystallization, especially since 2008, of the anti-
Islam and anti-immigration phobia of the radical right into a new generation of populist extremist 
parties and movements in a number of member states of the European Union,
28 
some of them 
prone to terrorist violence. This new variety of European populism puts at the centre of its 
platform the pre-9/11 ethnic threat that immigration is imagined to pose to European culture and 
identity. When Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people in Oslo in July 2011, he justified his 
terrorist attack with reference to a mixture of fear about the impact of Islam, globalization and 
the EU on the national (and European) identity. The German security services for their part came 
under fire at the end of 2011 for failing to effectively gauge the growth and danger of radical 
right extremism in the country. According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution 
(BfV), Germany's domestic intelligence agency, right-wing violence claimed 47 lives in 
Germany between 1990 and 2009. Other estimates calculate even higher numbers, as high as 
137.
29
 The handling of the radical right extremism finally led to the resignation of the BfV’s 
head and several other intelligence officials. 
 In other European countries, too, the emergence of radical right extremism has become 
of paramount concern. This trend is particularly worrying in Greece. Here, the economic crisis 
had clearly fuelled the rise of organized violent far-right activism directed against immigrants, 
reminiscent of the 1930s. 
Europe has primarily been an emigration continent for most of its history. Now it 
matches North America as a region of immigration. Exactly as has been the case with the nativist 
movement in American history since the 19
th
 century, the debate on immigration will 
undoubtedly go on, influenced by the changing composition of migration flows, with ups and 
downs and with diverging national characteristics, but largely dissociated from the security 
obsession generated by 9/11.  
 
The Essence of Counterterrorism in Europe 
Following 9/11, governments throughout Europe devoted much energy to 
counterterrorism: intelligence services and law enforcement capabilities were enhanced; specific 
counterterrorism legislation was adopted.
30
 Europe did not react differently from the U.S. in 
doing so. But two distinct characteristics set European counterterrorism apart from the U.S. 
approach. The latter equated the attacks with a declaration of war and responded with a global 
decapitation strategy and a domestic mobilization of the nation. The former mostly pursued its 
traditional law enforcement approach, whereby terrorism was considered a crime to be tackled 
primarily through criminal law. The second quintessential European characteristic in post 9/11 
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counterterrorism was its focus on prevention through the identification of the underlying factors 
that led to terrorism.
31
 For many years this so-called root cause approach was met with overt 
hostility in the U.S. counterterrorism community, where it was seen as condoning terrorist acts.
32 
The divergence was one of the many reasons why transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism 
proved so difficult in the years following 9/11. 
European counterterrorism moreover was not as constant an undertaking as in the United 
States. Its dynamics can be compared to successive shock waves propelled by major attacks, but 
gradually winding down once the sense of urgency had faded away.  
The 9/11 attacks themselves opened a window of opportunity to push forward earlier 
approved but stalled legislative proposals intended to harmonize national laws in the realm of 
internal security where national prerogatives had always been the bedrock of all arrangements. A 
comprehensive EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism was adopted within two weeks of the 
attacks. This led in the following months to a number of significant decisions and measures. 
Foremost was the decision establishing a European arrest warrant through which extradition 
procedures between member states were greatly facilitated. Another major breakthrough was the 
adoption of the framework decision defining a common concept of terrorist offenses. This served 
as the necessary basis for intra-EU judicial and police cooperation by its inclusion into the 
member states’ legal systems. Another scheme previously proposed – creating an EU-wide 
coordination body amongst magistrates to enhance the effectiveness of the competent judicial 
authorities of the Member States when dealing with the investigation and prosecution of serious 
cross-border and organized crime – was also rapidly put in place as ‘Eurojust’. Additionally, 
within Europol counterterrorism now became of paramount importance, in stark contrast to the 
early days of the organization when terrorism did not even figure among its priorities.
33 
 
By 2003, however, there seemed to be a diminished sense of urgency. The attacks at the 
Atocha railway station in Madrid put an end to this inertia. New operational arrangements were 
quickly decided on, including the appointment of a EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. 
However, as months passed by the drive to deepen cooperation once again lost momentum only 
to be revived by the London attacks. 
The EU adopted its overall European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy following the 
London attacks thus effectively streamlining the patchwork of decisions and mechanisms that 
had been put in place often in great haste following terrorist incidents. This had resulted in a 
policy architecture so complex that even EU-officials – let alone the public at large – lost sight of 
what had been decided, who was doing what when, and who was in charge of implementing the 
wide variety of decisions. 
The EU counterterrorism strategy was based upon four strategic objectives, called 
‘pillars’: ‘Prevent’, ‘Protect’, ‘Pursue’ and ‘Respond’. Deliberately, ‘Prevent’ was mentioned as 
the first of the four. It stood for stemming the radicalization process by tackling the root causes 
 10 
which can lead to radicalization and recruitment into terrorism. ‘Protect’ covered by far the 
broadest area since it aimed at sheltering citizens and infrastructure from new attacks. ‘Pursue’ 
related to the efforts to pursue and investigate terrorists and their networks across EU borders. 
‘Respond’ intended to put into practice a 2004 ‘solidarity clause’ by enhancing consequence 
management mechanisms and capabilities to be used in case of an attack in one of the member 
states. Most EU-wide results have been obtained in ‘Protect’, where the European Commission is 
a leading actor, and in ‘Pursue’, where the member states’ vital interests are at stake and close 
cross-border cooperation is needed. 
In the first and foremost pillar of EU’s counterterrorism strategy, ‘Prevent’, progress has 
long been most laggard. It’s the most complex and thus the most challenging of the four pillars, 
essentially because of competing analyses about the nature and scope of the radicalization 
challenge and the inherent difficulty of measuring success. 
At a very early stage in their efforts against jihadist terrorism and drawing on their own 
experiences of terrorism, the EU member states have been acutely aware that victory would not 
be achieved as long as the circumstances by which individuals turn into terrorists are not 
addressed. September 11 caught most EU member states by surprise. With the exception of the 
French and Belgian police and security forces (who had had some experience with Iranian-
backed and then Algerian Islamist terrorism in the 80s and early 90s) most European countries 
were unprepared when confronted with a seemingly new strand of terrorism and a new kind of 
terrorists who used religious discourse to legitimise their acts. It thus took some time for a 
consensus view on ‘root causes’ to emerge within the EU counterterrorism community. So the 
first references to ‘root causes’ in this particular variety of terrorism were quite diverse and 
impressionistic, including as diverse causes as radicalization, regional conflicts and failed or 
failing states, globalization and socio-economic factors, alienation, propagation of an extremist 
world-view, and systems of education.  
Gradually however, radicalization emerged as the main focal point in combating 
terrorism. Originally it was perceived as the result of foreign extremists attempting to influence 
vulnerable youngsters through radical mosques, prisons, schools, neglected city districts and 
internet chat rooms. But from 2004-2005 onwards the view of terrorism as an external threat lost 
its pre-eminence and was replaced by the analysis of terrorism as a bottom-up process by which 
individuals ‘self-radicalised’ and ‘self-recruited’ into terrorism. A number of parallel 
developments explain this evolution.  
This first was undoubtedly the Madrid bombings and its less than obvious links with al-
Qaeda. The perpetrators did not conform to the implicit standard terrorist profile of a devout 
Middle Eastern Muslim, but originated from the important Spanish-Moroccan migration 
diaspora. Secondly, substantial research by the Dutch intelligence service (AIVD)  provided the 
first solid moorings for the notions of ‘self-radicalization’ and ‘self-recruitment’ within EU 
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thinking. The AIVD was among the first intelligence services to emphasise publically that 
radicalization had become a major avenue by which individuals turned into terrorists, not so 
much as a result of active outside recruitment as by an autonomous, self-propelled process. The 
murders in 2002 of the libertarian Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn by a lone wolf activist and, 
especially, some years later of Theo van Gogh by a young member of a loose grouping of 
radicals, all of Moroccan descent and born or raised in the Netherlands (with the exception of 
one or two converts to Islam), turned the spotlight on home-grown terrorism. The AIVD was the 
first agency to introduce within the EU the notion of ‘decentralization of Islamist terrorism’.  
The London bombings firmly anchored radicalization, intertwined with its home-grown  
nature, at the heart of EU counterterrorism endeavours. From then on the terror threat within the 
EU was thus increasingly seen as a home-grown challenge and threat. International events – and 
the Iraq war in particular – increasingly appeared to function both as a booster and a source of 
inspiration to radical individuals. Iraq was seen as a black hole that attracted individuals from all 
over the world.  
Without fully realizing it, the EU found itself in new and uncharted territory, since this 
issue clearly impinged upon national sovereignty by going to the heart of political, social and 
cultural differences among member states. From the start, radicalization was indeed essentially 
intertwined with issues of integration, social policy, multiculturalism, and representation of 
minority groups. As a consequence, counterterrorism now had to involve actors that were largely 
unfamiliar with – and even hostile to – its sphere of operations: for example, integration officials 
and authorities, which were quite resistant to the idea that their longstanding endeavours should 
become  entwined with security-related objectives, thus ‘securitizing’ social policies.  
Since 2004-2005, a torrent of research on the issue of radicalization and de-radicalization 
has been unleashed, funded both by the European Commission and by member states. But the 
more research was produced on the issue, the clearer it became that the very notion of 
radicalization was ill defined, complex, and controversial. Notwithstanding the numerous 
endeavors in academia, police and policy circles no metrics exist to gauge radicalization. Most 
analyses of the growth or the scale of radicalization lack conceptual clarity and scientific 
fundamentals and therefore are incapable of providing empirical validation. Radicalization and 
de-radicalization have become catchall concepts. Religious and political radicalization were and 
still are often confounded,
34 
coupling issues of identity, social cohesion with national security 
concerns. Many different expressions of an individual’s ideas and behavior are thus being 
labeled as signs or indications of radicalization, and these range from the increased presence of 
girls and women wearing the hijab, men dressed in Salafi trousers, Salafi preachers and the 
terrorists themselves. Putting these disparate signs together into a box labeled ‘symbols of 
radicalization’ empties this word of all explanatory meaning, turning it into a container concept. 
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No clear EU-wide consensus has thus emerged on what kind of radicalization is to be 
addressed, or on the degree to which radical, but non-violent religious discourse is to be included 
in counterterrorism. Some, but not all member states recognise that there is an inherent tension 
between the fight against terrorism – a crime – and the fight against radicalization – aspects of 
which are constitutionally protected as free speech. Moreover, most European experts now agree 
that the relationship between terrorism and (radical) interpretations of ideologies and religion is 
more tenuous than was first assumed and that focusing on ideology (or religion) is clearly not the 
best departure point for grasping why an individual turns into a terrorist. But nevertheless, 
intelligence and police authorities in some European countries still persist in a rearguard view 
according to which signs of increased (salafist) religiosity are precursors of an eventual process 
of radicalisation into violence. They point to the persistence of a loosely connected European 
network of Islamic neoradical fringe groups, whose names can vary, but typically begin with the 
label ‘Sharia4’, followed by the country in which they operate (e.g. ‘Sharia4UK’, 
‘Sharia4Belgium’, etc.).35 
By 2010 – after a short-lived sense of urgency as a result of foiled plots in the UK, 
Germany, and Denmark – the drive for furthering EU-wide cooperation on counterterrorism had 
once again largely stalled. In November 2009, the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, Gilles de 
Kerchove, pointed to a growing sense of ‘CT fatigue’.36 The major reasons for this relative 
decline in EU counterterrorism activity are obvious. No major attacks have occurred since the 
London bombings. More crucially, jihadist terrorism has lost much of its formidable and larger-
than-life character it once had. It largely defeated itself, since it proved unable to realize any of 
the objectives that it pretended to advance. The once extremely dense network of personal inter-
linkages between individuals, groups and networks has inexorably unravelled and has been 
replaced by small, informal groups of wannabe terrorists with poor skill and terrorist tradecraft. 
Foreign fighters (trained militants returning from jihadist theatres) – once a source of major 
concern in the European counterterrorism community – proved to be much less of a threat than 
first imagined – even if in the course of 2012 the Syrian civil war has started to attact also 
youngsters from some (but clearly not all) European countries, as happened earlier in 2003 with 
Iraq. 
Perhaps even more important, as the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
mentioned in his December 2012 Terrorist Threat Assessment Netherlands, the resilience against 
extremism and violence has grown substantially, both within the public at large and within 
Muslim communities, signaling an increased desire by the latter to publicly air their opposition 
to this kind of violent activism. Terrorism-related discussions have clearly receded in public 
discussions and concerns.
37
 This assessments is in line with similar UK assessments that since 
2007 sympathy for violent extremism has been declining rather than increasing.
38
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Since 2009, many member states of the EU have thus officially lowered their threat 
levels. Taking into account this diminished threat, the EU (and UN) mechanisms in place are 
producing satisfying results, so that no new instruments appear needed for the time being. 
Moreover, the EU-wide emphasis on radicalization and de-radicalization – the main focus 
of Europe’s counterterrorism in the decade following 9/11 – has reached its limits and the 
impossibility of implementing a Europe-wide ‘one size fits all’ de-radicalization approach is now 
widely acknowledged. Since terrorism is primarily the outcome of individual or small group 
dynamics boosting political radicalization into violent action, the local level is the primary and 
most adequate level for counter-radicalization initiatives.
39
 
Through a decade of counterterrorism legislation, EU member states have nevertheless 
gone far beyond what most observers and member states thought achievable – and desirable – in 
the field of justice and home affairs, where most of Europe’s counterterrorism endeavours are 
situated. This is without doubt the area where the role of the EU has grown most significantly in 
the first decade of the 21
st
 century.
40
 Counterterrorism has acted as a booster for cooperative 
cross-border arrangements going far beyond terrorism.  
This in turn has led to mounting criticism that liberty has been sacrificed on the altar of 
security. The European Parliament – whose powers the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 significantly 
enhanced – increasingly made its mark on counterterrorism related issues. The European 
Parliament proved to be a formidable stumbling block for the EU’s 2010 compliance with the US 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) as well as for the agreements reached by the 
European Commission and the United States on personal data exchanges (PNR). It  will almost 
certainly be an influential voice in the elaboration and scope of a possible European PNR system 
in the year 2013. Leading MEPs have been calling for a thorough assessment of the impact of 
counter-terrorism measures, in particular on civil liberties and fundamental rights.
41
 It is indeed 
beyond dispute that counterterrorism arrangements have been infringing upon civil liberties and 
individual privacy: extension of detention time, increased surveillance of individual movements 
and information gathering, enhanced data recording and storage. Responding to such concerns 
over excessive state intrusion, the European Union is rethinking how it logs citizens' telephone 
calls and Internet use data for law enforcement purposes.  
These mounting challenges to counterterrorism arrangements reflect by themselves the 
decreased willingness to accept the overriding priority of counterterrorism over other political 
concerns, the declining priority of counterterrorism in European governments’ policies and in 
EU institutions and, ultimately, the fading anxiety over terrorist attacks.  
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Europe’s place in the world 
The 9/11 attacks led to a spontaneous expression of European solidarity with the United 
States. The ensuing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) shattered this transatlantic unity. 
Moreover, it divided Europe along the pre-9/11 fault line between Europeanist and Atlanticist 
countries.  
After the end of the Cold War, a transatlantic debate had started on the commonality of 
American and European perspectives on world affairs. Especially in the original member states 
of the EU, a growing Europeanist point of view was stressing the need for the EU to speak with 
one voice in world affairs, commensurate to its enhanced economic might. Throughout the 1990s 
new arrangements were devised strengthening European decision making in foreign and defense 
matters parallel to NATO. Strategic partnerships were envisaged with other great powers, such 
as Russia and China, allowing the EU to take an autonomous stance in international relations. 
However, with new member states in Central and Eastern Europe joining the EU in the 1990s, 
this Europeanist development was slowed down, since the new members considered the United 
States and thus American leadership in NATO as the ultimate guarantor of their newly acquired 
independence. 
The 9/11 attacks and the ensuing uncertainty about the new contours of the post-9/11 
world order pushed this nascent European autonomy in world affairs to the back burner. But this 
new spike in transatlantic rapprochement didn’t last long. When American diplomacy shifted 
from its original multilateral reaction into an increasingly unilateralist policy, influential 
European voices were again heard insisting upon a distinct European position in the post-9/11 
world. Even pro-American figures such as Javier Solana (Europe’s first High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy) or Chris Patten (European Commissioner for External 
Relations from 1999 to 2004) called for a strong and united European challenge to American 
unilateralism: ‘The United States should not establish itself as the world hegemon, setting and 
imposing rules – but not itself being bound by them – in pursuit of its own national interest.’42 
An influential essay by Robert Kagan, depicting the Europeans as naive Kantians and the 
Americans as realistic Hobbesians, was characteristic of this transatlantic divide.
43
 
The American global war on terror pitted two groups of EU member states against one 
another, labeled ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.44 Especially in ‘Old’ 
Europe, American counterterrorism tactics were met with significant resistance: a string of CIA-
run secret detention centers (so-called black sites in Poland, Rumania, and Lithuania), 
Guantanamo Bay, and the rendition program (abducting terror suspects from European countries 
and transporting them for questioning to third countries) were almost universally criticized. The 
U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the climax of European division, some member states 
 15 
participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom whilst others joined China and Russia and many other 
countries in strong condemnation of the invasion. 
This period represented a low in European publics’ confidence in transatlantic relations. 
Europe-wide surveys indicated how the EU desire for an ‘American leadership role in world 
affairs’ plummeted from as high as 64 percent in 2002 to an historic low of 36 percent in 2007-
8.
45
 Other surveys showed large majorities in EU member states, even in reputedly Atlanticist 
countries, asking governments for a more independent approach from the U.S. on security and 
diplomatic affairs.
46
 
In striking contrast to the United States, European countries never viewed the military as 
a prime player in counterterrorism – with the exception of the U.N. authorised war in 
Afghanistan. Even if the European Council in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 stated as its 
expressed aim ‘to make the fight against terrorism part of all aspects of the EU’s external 
actions’, this never materialised. When in June 2004 the European Council asked the Political 
and Security Committee – the main decision-making body on foreign and defence policy within 
the EU – to elaborate upon the contribution the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 
specifically could render in the fight against terrorism, a feeling of perplexity and bewilderment 
was palpable.  
The arrival of the Obama-administration relaxed the transatlantic relationship. However, 
even though he enjoyed an extraordinary personal popularity in European surveys, even Obama 
was unable to restore the status quo ante in Europeans’ confidence in the American leadership 
role. This never regained the high marks it had enjoyed until 2002. Years of transatlantic 
estrangement following 9/11 had left their mark. The Europeanist tendency within the EU has 
been strengthened by formerly Atlanticist member states, such as Poland, now adopting a more 
outspoken stance in favour of European defence structures and arrangements. The American 
attitude of benign neglect of Europe, now considered to be of less relevance in world affairs than 
the emerging powers in Asia, is increasingly met with European indifference towards US 
policies.  
The main effect of the U.S. global war on terror on the foreign policy orientations of the 
EU and its member states has thus ultimately been the strengthening of the Europeanists’ 
tendency claiming for a stronger European voice in world affairs. However, by 2012 the reality 
was a far cry from the vision of a powerful European voice in world affairs. Entangled in the 
euro zone crisis and disagreeing on how to move forward because of its cumbersome decision-
making process projecting the image of a weak Europe, this crisis is likely to be of much greater 
significance as far as Europe’s place in the world in the world is concerned than 9/11 ever was. 
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Conclusion 
A decade after 9/11, the impact of jihadist terrorism has now largely subsided in both 
publics and politics. Law enforcement, intelligence agencies and police will probably concur that 
radicalisation into jihadist violence has passed its peak and is decreasing. It is probably fair to 
say that this strand of terrorism is now seen as any other form of terrorism in Europe: a minor, 
but possible risk, but no longer the existential threat official European discourse routinely 
evoked. In the post 9/11 era, notwithstanding the pervasiveness of this discourse, by and large 
Europeans often showed sound skepticism as to the level of the threat. Terrorism indeed never 
became a prime concern for most European citizens – save in the immediate post 9/11 months 
and even then with wide discrepancies in threat perception across the continent. 
The main impact of 9/11 on European societies has been to crystallize the pre-existing 
debate on immigration around the culturalist paradigm. In mainstream thinking the culture of the 
immigrants came to be seen as the major obstacle to their integration. Issues as discrimination, 
disadvantaged socioeconomic position, and unemployment in the immigrant communities and 
their impact upon radicalization receded in the publics’ mind. Whilst the febrile debate on the 
compatibility of Islam with western values that had ensued has abated, a decade long Islam-
centered security obsession has left its mark. Anti-Muslim prejudice has gained traction in 
mainstream thinking – even if its most extremist expression has again become the hallmark of a 
new generation of radical right groups, who  claim the anti-Islam and anti-immigration themes as 
their unique selling proposition. But as was the case before 9/11, the situation differs among 
countries, with some countries displaying a more serene debate about the place of Muslims and 
Islam in society than others. One could argue that as apprehension among the public about Islam 
fluctuates, polity and media shoulder a crucial responsibility as to the way this issue is framed 
and discussed.Immigration and integration will indeed undoubtedly continue to be matters of 
intense policy discussion, sometimes (but not always) linked to Islam. Since Europe too has 
become an immigration continent, it experiences the same fluctuating apprehensions about the 
newcomers’ impact on society as the United States did with the nativist movement from the 19th 
century onwards. Nativist anti-immigration sentiments indeed remain present in European 
countries as well as grievances resulting from the fragile socio-economical position of 
immigration communities. This mix remains a potent cocktail  for polarization and a major 
challenge for society in general. But they are now by and large devoid of the national security 
concerns they were associated with in the years following 9/11. 
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